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This article presents a review of the literature that focuses on the role played by
information asymmetry in the management of innovation. Results are organised in
two categories. On the one hand, information asymmetry is considered as a major
source of market failures because it affects the quality of innovative goods and
services available on the market and disturbs the process of allocating resources
efficiently. On the other hand, information asymmetry is presented as a major source
of market opportunities, the latter existing only because individuals do not possess
the same - exhaustive and complete sets of - information. Therefore, information
asymmetry plays a dual role as it both generates market failures and gives birth to
entrepreneurial opportunities. Within this framework, the article discusses the main
implications of managing innovation under asymmetric information.
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Introduction
Mainstream economists consider that information asymmetry is a major source of
market failures as it affects how individuals assess the quality of goods and services
available on the marketplace (Akerlof 1970) and/or how individuals anticipate on
others' intentions and agency (Spence 1976). When individuals are incapable of evalu-
ating the quality of goods and services and/or are unable to observe other individuals'
private information, then the market fails to produce equilibrium prices and coordinate
transactions efficiently (Stiglitz 2000). Examples of economic situations involving asym-
metric information include employers seeking to discover the true abilities of their future
employees before recruiting them (Spence 2002) or investors trying to discover the true
value of a firm before investing in or acquiring it. Interestingly, some other economists, in
particular the tenants of the Austrian tradition in economics, consider that information
asymmetry, far from being a source of market failures, is a condition for market oppor-
tunities to emerge. In this view, opportunities exist only because individuals do not pos-
sess substitutable information sets (either complete or incomplete) regarding market
forces and technology. It follows that asymmetric information creates the conditions for
entrepreneurs to search for new business opportunities, leading them to find ways toBarbaroux; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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and supply attitudes’ (Kirzner 1997, p. 62).
The foregoing suggests that information asymmetry plays a dual role as it raises
transaction costs and generates market failures but at the same time, creates market
opportunities, providing incentives to develop innovations through the creation of new
ventures. Two theoretical approaches are thus competing. The first one refers to the
notion of information asymmetry as a market failure requiring specific arrangements
regarding the financing of research and development (R&D) activities, the allocation of
control among stakeholders (e.g. inventors, financiers, users) or the distribution of
property rights (Aghion and Tirole 1994). According to that approach, information is
assimilated to a commodity that can be exchanged through market mechanisms, re-
quiring stakeholders to negotiate for contractual arrangements that aim at minimizing
transaction costs. The second approach refers to the idea of information asymmetry as
a major source of market opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman 2000) and competi-
tive advantage (Miller 2003), the latter being unveiled through a process of ‘entrepre-
neurial discovery’ (Kirzner 1997). This second view puts particular emphasis on
information asymmetries resulting from differences in individuals' knowledge and cog-
nitive abilities. Therein, asymmetrically distributed cognition is a major source of inter-
individual differentiation that allows certain individuals (and organisations) to create,
identify and seize business opportunities.
This article elaborates on the dual character of the concept of information asymmetry
regarding its impact on innovation management. It contends that a comprehensive re-
view that examines both approaches of information asymmetry can help improve our
understanding of how innovations are managed under asymmetric information. Indus-
trial organisation theorists subtly suggested that the ‘recognition of informational asym-
metries and the strategic possibilities they engender can yield models that begin to
capture the richness of behaviour that marks the real world’ (Milgrom and Roberts
1987, p. 185, italics added). Among the strategic possibilities mentioned by Milgrom
and Roberts, some are specifically concerned with the management of innovation and
R&D activities. The goal of this article was thus to build on the economics of informa-
tion asymmetry to provide a more complete perspective on the relationship of asym-
metric information to innovation. The literature review will focus on three streams of
research in innovation management: industrial economics, financial economics and
entrepreneurship. These research streams help illustrate that information asymmetries
exert a direct but ambiguous influence on innovation and R&D.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. It begins by discussing the concept of
information asymmetry and its relationship to innovation management. Then, the art-
icle introduces methodological statements regarding how the bibliometric search has
been conducted. Next, results are presented and organised in two categories. Finally,
the article discusses the main implications of the review and introduces propositions to
guide future research.
The economics of information asymmetry and the management of innovation
Standard microeconomics theory assumes that information sets regarding goods and
services available on the market are complete and perfect. Within this framework,
‘everyone knows everything’ (Milgrom and Roberts 1987), p. 184, transaction costs tend
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many cases, individuals have private information about themselves (e.g. their prefer-
ences) and their economic environment which may or may not be complete but differ
from others' information sets. According to Stiglitz (2000), information asymmetries
among agents alter the nature of market processes. Akerlof (1970) early indicated that
informational problems are likely to interfere with market-clearing mechanisms. His
classical work on ‘the market for lemons’ demonstrated that when buyers and sellers
do not share the same information sets during a transaction, goods and services of het-
erogeneous quality can coexist in the marketplace. As Stiglitz (2000) argued, ‘because of
these […] problems of information […] the exchange process is intertwined with the
process of selection over hidden characteristics and the process of providing incentives
for hidden behaviors’ (Stiglitz 2000, p. 1447). Under conditions of asymmetric informa-
tion therefore, ‘bad-quality providers can enter the market and drive out the good qual-
ity providers by so lowering price that the latter cannot obtain returns on their
investments for competence enhancement’ (Nayyar 1990), p. 517.
The recognition that information is imperfect, costly, asymmetrically distributed and
affected by the agents' strategic behaviours ‘provided explanations of economic and so-
cial phenomena that otherwise would be hard to understand’ (Stiglitz 2000, p. 1441). In
that view, economists discriminate between two types of information asymmetry: moral
hazard and adverse selection. Guesnerie et al. (1989, p. 807) referred to the notions of
‘hidden knowledge’ and ‘hidden actions’ to identify these two sources of inefficiency in
resource allocation. While moral hazard results from the inability of one individual
(called the Principal in Standard Agency Theory, SAT) to monitor another individual's
(called the Agent in SAT) actions, adverse selection corresponds to the inability of the
principal to observe an agent's private information (Picard 1987, p. 305). Because the
properties of incentive contracts ‘are altered in the presence of such concerns about in-
formation management’ (Lewis and Sappington 1997, p. 797), research efforts focused
on designing contractual arrangements that aim at reducing the negative impacts of in-
formation asymmetries. Two broad categories of contractual agency are likely to reduce
information asymmetry: (1) self-selection, in particular through information disclosure
and signalling, and screening, and (2) designing of incentive structures and monitoring
(Stiglitz 2000). The first category provides rational responses to adverse selection prob-
lems; the second one is likely to reduce moral hazard situations.
Many economic situations involving problems of information asymmetry have been
investigated in the literature. The latter includes employers who invest time and re-
sources in order to observe the real productivity and true abilities of their (current and
future) employees or venture capitalists who want to know the return on various tech-
nologies in which they might invest. Any of these situations induce additional search
costs at least for the agents who have to invest time and effort to discover the real char-
acteristics of goods and services available on the marketplace and/or the behaviours of
other agents with whom they negotiate. Although the economics of information ‘has
provided a new set of lenses through which a wide variety of issues can be viewed’
(Stiglitz 2000, p. 1453), there is one among those issues that deserved special attention
from economists: innovation management. Aghion and Tirole (1994) suggested that
understanding how innovation is managed under asymmetric information requires re-
freshing our views on ‘how to finance the research activities, how to allocate control
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ture the monetary compensations to the inventors’ (Aghion and Tirole 1994, p. 1185).
Investigating innovation management under asymmetric information opens up new
ways of theorising on ‘the exact microeconomic process by which information and
ideas move along the supply chain in the production of knowledge’ (Martimort et al.
2010, p. 324). As Martimort et al. (2010, p. 325) explained ‘commercial ideas may con-
tain technical aspects often hard to describe contractually but privately known by inno-
vators’. Therefore, stakeholders involved in the management of innovation (including
innovators, financiers and users) must find way to design optimal contracts which pro-
vide incentives to disclose private information and hamper the negative effects of con-
tractual hazards and opportunistic behaviours.
How do agents manage to reduce the impacts and/or harness the benefits of informa-
tion asymmetries when collectively participating in the process of inventing new ideas
and capturing value from their commercialisation? Next, sections investigate this ques-
tion by building on a literature review that aims at providing a more complete perspec-
tive on the relationship of asymmetric information to innovation management.
Methodology
Our bibliometric search required criteria for selecting the types of articles to be in-
cluded in the analysis. In addition, it needed a search strategy for collecting data, classi-
fying them and analysing their theoretical and empirical content. Given the huge
amount of researches on the economics of information asymmetry, the review is fo-
cused on articles investigating innovation management under asymmetric information.
To search for appropriate literature investigating the above research question, we began
by exploring two academic databases: JSTOR (Ithaka) and ScienceDirect (Elsevier) by
using the following Boolean phrase: ‘Asymmetric information’ or ‘Information asym-
metry’. In order to refine the search process, we introduced the following additional
keywords using the ‘AND’ Boolean operator: ‘Innovation’, ‘Innovation management’ and
‘Entrepreneurship’. The foregoing led us to reduce the sample of articles investigating
innovation and entrepreneurship under conditions of asymmetric information. Then,
we scanned the bibliographies of the most recent articles to ensure that we did not
miss seminal articles, limiting our investigation on those articles that have been pub-
lished in the leading journals in economics and management science. We referred to
the 45th edition of the Journal Quality List (JQL; Harzing 2012) to identify leading
journals in financial economics, industrial organisation, entrepreneurship and
innovation management (e.g. The American Economic Review, Administrative Science
Quarterly, Management Science, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Academy of
Management Review, The Journal of Finance). The method for analysis of collected
data was to first discriminate articles according to their disciplinary background. Three
sub-disciplines have been identified: applied microeconomics (including industrial or-
ganisation), financial economics and entrepreneurship (including the management of
innovation and R&D)a.
Next, we investigated the content of each article. Our goal was to determine each
article's main theme, theoretical background, methodology and relevant findings. Build-
ing on the foregoing classification, we identified three core topics related to the man-
agement of innovation under asymmetric information: contracting for innovations,
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merely investigated by industrial and financial economists who analysed how stake-
holders manage to mitigate information asymmetries either by disclosing information
(signalling strategies) or negotiating efficient contracts for allocating property rights or
transferring knowledge and technology. The third topic has been studied by economists
(in particular those of the Austrian tradition) and organisational theorists who seek to
understand how information asymmetries generate opportunities for creating new ven-
tures and capturing value from innovations. While industrial and financial economists
share the view that innovations already exist and that the core problem is about design-
ing contractual arrangements that enable participants to ‘fix’ market failures rooted in
information asymmetries, economists and organisational theorists rather focus research
efforts on how individuals and firms manage to discover and seize entrepreneurial op-
portunities that lead to invent and commercialise new ideas.
The management of innovation under asymmetric information: three core issues
The next sections discriminate between three core issues regarding the management of
innovation under asymmetric information: contracting for innovation, financing
innovation and developing innovation.
Contracting for innovation
Many studies dealt with the question of how information asymmetry makes the manage-
ment of innovation under asymmetric information a complicated process, therefore re-
quiring specific contractual arrangements to mitigate its effects (Crémer and Khalil 1992;
Grossman and Hart 1983a; Grossman and Hart 1983b; Hart and Moore 1988; Milgrom
and Roberts 1986; Milgrom and Roberts 1987; Sappington 1982; Sappington 1991).
Within this framework, scholars studied how information asymmetries influence the
contractual arrangements set up by innovation stakeholders when meeting innovation-
related challenges, including value capturing, knowledge sharing, technology transfer,
organisation design of R&D and the diffusion of innovations.
To investigate these topics, scholars elaborated on specific theoretical tools, essen-
tially standard agency theory (SAT), incomplete contract theory and game theory.
Within this framework, one of the core hypothesis made by industrial (and financial
economists) is that strategic disclosure of private information is likely to mitigate the
effects of information asymmetries (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Bhattacharya and Ritter
1983). Signalling is thus considered as an efficient behaviour when confronting adverse
selection issues (Spence 2002). However, as Lewis (2011) argued, whether information
disclosure through signalling strategies reduces information asymmetries depends on
two parameters: the costs associated to private information disclosure and the presence
of some institutional framework allowing contractual enforcement. Anton and Yao
(2004), for example, indicated that when property rights are weak, disclosure incentives
are relatively stronger, in particular for nondrastic (e.g. incremental) innovations. It fol-
lows that secrecy (i.e. no disclosure at all) is considered by the firm as a better response
in order to protect drastic (e.g. radical) innovations from imitation and harness the full
benefit of their commercialisation. In the same vein, Jansen (2010) argued that incen-
tives to strategically disclose information depend on the trade-off between two effects:
business stealing and free riding that come from information asymmetries. The
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winner takes all, over-invest in R&D. The free rider effect appears when the winner
firm of an R&D race is not capable of appropriating the full revenue of its innovation,
because the later generates positive externalities (see Jansen 2010, p. 350). In this
framework, the disclosure strategy is affected by the nature of the legal environment
governing appropriation issues, the latter determining the spill-over value (i.e. strong
versus weak externalities) attached to the innovation. It follows that information
disclosure is also dependent upon the type of innovation at stake, the latter being deter-
minative for the allocation of property rights among agents (Aghion and Tirole 1994)
and the selection of the fittest appropriation regime for capturing and sharing the value
generated by the commercialisation of innovations. Besides legal issues, the inventor is
also affected by its initial financial resources when dealing with appropriation of
innovation value. Anton and Yao (1994) indicated that an inventor with limited initial
resources is likely to capture a sizeable share of the market value of the innovation by
revealing its invention before starting negotiations (ex post contracting). It follows that
with larger financial resources (e.g. from venture capitalists), an inventor prefers ex
ante contracting, in which parties try to mitigate information asymmetries by
employing an appropriately structured ex ante contract. In a later article, Anton and
Yao (2002) further indicated that when inventors are wealth constrained, rent appropri-
ation through market sale is lower and this might cause (1) an inventor to go to market
earlier and/or (2) an inventor to connect to a financial intermediary to obtain additional
funds prior to taking invention to customers.
In line with the previous research streams, it has been demonstrated that knowledge
sharing is facilitated when there exists a legal environment that frames the agents'
knowledge exchanges by protecting the innovators' investments. Exploring optimal
contracting within a two-stage R&D joint venture, Bhattacharya et al. (1990) explained
that knowledge sharing among firms is made easier when it is possible to sign agree-
ments that specify how the gains from success will be divided among parties. Ex ante
agreements to share revenue from innovation are likely to reduce competitive pressure
between the firms and ‘restore incentives for sharing knowledge’ (Bhattacharya et al.
1990), p. 204. It follows that by designing license contracts with patented innovations,
firms are more capable of managing knowledge sharing and technology transfer issues.
Investigating licensing contracts' agreements between firms that aim at transferring
protected innovations, Gallini and Wright (1990) explained that the latter respond to
two information asymmetry problems: (1) the superiority of a licensor's information on
the value of the innovation and (2) the ability of licensees to ‘invent around’ the trans-
ferred innovation. Within this framework, output royalties, rent sharing between the
licensor and the licensee(s), and exclusive versus nonexclusive licenses represent the
various options available to the firms that seek to cooperate in order to exploit
innovations. Gallini and Wright (1990) discriminate between two types of innovation:
low-value (low-cost) and high-value (high-cost) innovations. Then, the authors demon-
strated that low-cost innovations ‘can be fully exploited with an exclusive contract and
a fixed fee’ (Gallini and Wright 1990, p. 157), while high-cost innovations require (1) ex-
clusive contracts with nonlinear royalties in output when the innovation is drastic
(nonexclusive contracts when the innovation is nondrastic), (2) rent sharing contacts
when imitation costs are low and/or there exists large rent differential between drastic
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innovation is drastic and imitation costs are large. In another article, Gallini and Winter
(1985, p. 238) already assumed that incentives to invest in R&D under licensing agree-
ments depend on the firms' production costs; when the latter differs, licensing discourages
research, while it is encouraged when firms exhibit close production costs. Adopting a
game theoretic approach of agency problems, Anton and Yao (1995) explored the specific
question of organisation design of R&D when invention emerges within the firm (the prin-
cipal) thanks to the creative work of one of its employee (the agent). Fundamentally, the
organisational option adopted shall have a direct impact on the allocation of property
rights and the way innovations' value is captured and distributed among agents. In the
situation that Anton and Yao (1995) investigated, both the firm and the employee are
facing a trade-off between various organisational options: creating a start-up, introducing
a spin-off company or internalising the innovation project. The authors argued that the
start-up option is likely to be implemented depending on (1) the employee's ease of access
to financial resources relative to the value of invention, (2) the expected profits of a
monopoly with a start-up when compared with the expected profits of a monopoly under
a spin-off and (3) the symmetric versus asymmetric distribution of the bargaining power
between the firm and its employees.
Adopting a different theoretical perspective, Riordan and Sappington (1987) modelled
a two-step production process with privately informed agents in order to examine how
information asymmetries regarding realisation costs at each step influence the choice
of the fittest organisational mode. Organisation design options available to the entre-
preneur (the principal) include partial delegation versus complete delegation of some
task to a specialised firm (the agent). Riordan and Sappington (1987, p. 244) suggested
that the selection of a particular organisation design by the principal depends upon (1) the
level of dependency of cost realisations, (2) the negative or positive nature of the correl-
ation between cost realisations and (3) the degree (large versus small) of (negative) correl-
ation. Investigating the question of organising R&D activities in a principal-agent
framework, Aghion and Tirole (1994) suggested that integrated organisational forms
in which the agent (a customer) owns and freely uses the innovation provided by
the principal (a research unit) are likely to fit situations exhibiting (1) a capital-
intensive innovation environment, (2) asymmetric bargaining powers benefiting to
the agent (customer) over the principal (research unit) and (3) a customer that
does not suffer from financial constraints. When the situation does not show
evidence of those three conditions, it may be optimal for a customer to give prop-
erty rights to the research unit and to demand additional financial resources from
an external investor.
Connected to technological transfer and organisation design issues is the one
concerned with the adoption and/or diffusion of innovations. Indeed, following Lapan
and Moschini (2000, p. 525), ‘it is not the mere discovery of new knowledge that leads
to economic progress: to realize private and/or social benefits it is necessary for an
innovation to be adopted by firms’. It follows that when an innovation is not adopted
directly by the innovator, it has to be transferred to other firms, for example, through
licensing agreements. Bhattacharya et al. (1986) proposed an empirically plausible the-
ory of the diffusion of innovations when innovation payoffs' distributions are unknown.
Reproducing some stylized facts related to the rate and speed of diffusion, and the
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novations is not dependent upon variations in firms' priors regarding the (ex ante
unknown) performance of an innovation. Rather, random differences in observed sam-
ples are sufficient to yield diffusion curve matching the commonly observed empirical
regularities in diffusion (Bhattacharya et al. 1986, p. 220). In the same vein, Quirmbach
(1986, p. 42) indicated that the diffusion of a new technology is not caused by external
shocks or user firms' information asymmetries but results from ‘declining incremental
benefits and adoption costs’. Diffusion is thus the outcome of asymmetries not among
players' information sets but in the payoffs' distributions.
Financing innovation
Within the context of capital markets for R&D, information asymmetry between entre-
preneurs and investors creates market failures (e.g. credit rationing) that call for effi-
cient contractual arrangements to mitigate its negative effects. Within the capital
market, the sources of information asymmetries are diverse. As Aboody and Lev
(2000, p. 2750) argued, ‘the uniqueness of R&D investments makes it difficult for out-
siders to learn about the productivity and value of a given firm's R&D from the per-
formance and products of other firms, thereby contributing to information asymmetry’.
In addition, it has been demonstrated that ‘market players in closer touch with a firm
and its business (…) are those who possess better information about that firm’ (Barath
et al. 2009, p. 3215). Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) examined the credit rationing phenom-
ena in the capital markets as merely caused by asymmetric information among capital
suppliers and borrowers. The authors explained that banks may prefer to reject some
borrowers because of negative adverse selection and incentive effects; for a given collat-
eral, an increase in the rate of interest causes adverse selection, since only borrowers
with riskier investments will apply for a loan at a higher interest rate. Similarly, higher
interest payments create an incentive for investors to choose projects with a higher
probability of bankruptcy. Extending the work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Bester
(1985) further suggested that no credit rationing will occur if banks compete by choos-
ing simultaneously collateral requirements and the rate of interest, the latter enabling
them to screen investors' risk profiles and eliminate the riskiest.
Investigating less traditional financial organisations' investment strategies, Trester
(1998) demonstrated that venture capitalists use equity (i.e. preferred equity) rather
than debt to finance entrepreneurial projects because this contract eliminates the fore-
close option which is known to be a source of opportunistic behaviours. Indeed, entre-
preneurs benefiting from superior information about the innovation profitability might
be tempted to take project payoffs and defaulting on the debt, when the parties adopted
such a contract. Audretsch et al. (2012) indicated that venture capitalists are likely to
mitigate the negative effects of information asymmetry (e.g. opportunistic behaviours)
by privileging innovative firms when they combine appropriability signals (i.e. patents
and patents' applications) with feasibility information (i.e. prototypes). Another strategy
for financial institutions to discover the true performance of entrepreneurs' project is
to observe whether or not the latter receives financial support from public organisa-
tions. Takalo and Tanayama (2010) pointed out that if a project received a public sub-
sidy from a public agency, it provides a signal about the quality of the R&D project.
Such a subsidy-observation increases the success probability of the project anticipated
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the cost of external capital for subsidised projects.
Complementing financial institutions' (i.e. principals) efforts to mitigate the negative
effects of asymmetric information, the voluntary disclosure of private information by
innovative firms (i.e. agents) is also likely to facilitate investment contracts' arrange-
ments. Building on a literature review of empirical corporate disclosure strategies as
observed in capital markets, Healy and Pelepu (2001) indicated that voluntary disclos-
ure of corporate information, including internal reports and financial analysts' and au-
ditors’ reports, helps mitigate information asymmetries (and agency problems).
Disclosure is also associated with stock price performance, bid-ask spreads, analysts'
following and institutional ownership. Ang and Cheng (2011) suggested that firms that
need external financing choose and maintain a higher level of communication with the
market, the latter being associated with a higher probability of equity issuance. The au-
thors further indicated that depending on the firms' financial constraints, communica-
tion channels shall differ; public communication channels are more likely to be
adopted by firms with little cash, while communication through interactions with ana-
lysts is a preferred option for high-growth firms.
Although the voluntary disclosure of private information is likely to generate positive
outcomes in facilitating the negotiation of contractual arrangements, it has also been
shown that inventors may be reluctant to fully disclose private information to potential
investors because they fear opportunistic behaviours and imitation. Discussing the fi-
nancing of new ventures under asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and fi-
nanciers, Shane and Cable (2002) considered that the explanations provided by
economists (e.g. self-selection through signalling, the allocation of property rights or
the staging of capital) are incomplete for at least two reasons. ‘First, the over optimism
of entrepreneurs (…) undermines the effectiveness of the contractual mechanisms de-
scribed by economists’ (Shane and Cable 2002, p. 366), making self-selection ineffect-
ive. The argument brought by the authors is that early-stage investors cannot shift all
the risk of investing in a new venture to entrepreneurs and ‘must make investments
that risk the total loss of their capital’ (Shane and Cable 2002, p. 366). In addition, in-
formation disclosure through patenting for example can not lead outsiders (i.e. venture
capitalists) to gain all the private information they need. As Kyles (1985, p. 1326) ar-
gued, although insiders' information get progressively incorporated into market signals
through information disclosure, ‘not all information is incorporated into prices’.
Developing innovation
As Shane (2000, p. 451) authoritatively declared that ‘opportunities exist because differ-
ent people possess different information’. An opportunity denotes a favourable circum-
stance or combination of circumstances raising a promising state of affairs within
particular conditions of time and space. Ardichvili et al. (2003, p. 108) defined an op-
portunity as ‘a chance to meet a market need (…) through a creative combination of
resources to deliver superior value’. Shane and Venkataraman (2000, p. 220) further
suggested that entrepreneurial opportunities ‘are those situations in which new goods,
services, raw materials, and organising methods can be introduced and sold at greater
than their cost of production’. In its most elemental form, an opportunity describes ‘a
phenomena that begin unformed and become more developed through time’
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ual or a group of individuals. As a result, opportunities (1) are likely to be limited in
time, (2) need to be discovered and (3) sized through some entrepreneurial agency
(Kirzner 1997).
Exploring the role played by market imperfections (e.g. externalities, flawed pricing
mechanisms, inefficient firms and asymmetric information) in generating opportunities
within markets for sustainable goods and services, Cohen and Winn (2007) acknowl-
edged that asymmetrically distributed information create conditions for opportunities
to emerge. The authors further contended that ‘the poorer the information is, the
greater the number and scope of entrepreneurial opportunities’ (Cohen and Winn
2007, p. 44). The foregoing suggests that information gaps are a powerful engine of
innovation since they constitute major sources of opportunities. Indeed, the discovery
and exploitation of (valuable) opportunities are likely to generate entrepreneurial
profits (Eckhardt and Shane 2003). Since entrepreneurs hold information about what
they know and do outsiders do not possess, scholars indicated that they can earn rents
by exploiting information asymmetries, the latter being considered as a source of mon-
opoly power. Davis (2001) contended that rents can be obtained by combining four
information-oriented strategies: ‘(1) publish the details of the innovation in return for
legal protection (patents, copyrights and the like), (2) keep the information inside the
firm (secrecy, tacit and firm specific knowledge), (3) make the information selectively
available to others on an informal basis and (4) widely disseminate the information
making it freely accessible to all comers’ (Davis 2001, p. 327). In doing so, firms seek to
control how information about the characteristics of their innovations get revealed to
the market (disclosure strategies) in order to confront potential competition (through
imitation for example) and ensure sustainable profitability.
The above discussion of the role played by asymmetric information in the origination
of economic opportunities is in line with the Austrian theory of competition as a dis-
covery procedure. Kirzner (1997), p.73 indicated that ‘competition that characterizes
the market process reveals information which no one was aware of its having been
lacking’. Therein, entrepreneurship is the driving force that leads individuals ‘pushing
back the boundaries of sheer ignorance […] increasing mutual awareness among mar-
ket participants and thus, in turn, driving prices, output and input quantities and qual-
ities, toward values consistent with equilibrium’ (Kirzner 1997, p. 62). In other words,
entrepreneurship - considered as a discovery process - is likely to mitigate the negative
effects generated by information asymmetries on the allocation of scarce resources,
therefore transforming market failures into market opportunities. This does not mean
that individuals sharing identical information sets shall equally be capable of recognising
all opportunities.
Indeed, individuals differ according to their prior knowledge, the latter being deter-
minative for their ability to detect and make sense of information. While opportunities
exist objectively, their recognition remains heavily dependent upon the individuals' abil-
ities (Amit et al. 1990). Adopting an industrial economics perspective, Crémer and
Khalil (1992, p. 566) suggested that ‘in reality […] the fundamental asymmetry lies in
the ability to acquire information’, not simply in the characters attached to information
itself (see also Tirole 2009 for a cognitive view on incomplete contract theory). It re-
sults that opportunities can not result from a rational search procedure but requires
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through the cognitive process of mental recognition. Within this framework, Shane
(2000, p. 452) suggested that ‘three major dimensions of prior knowledge are important
to the process of entrepreneurial discovery: prior knowledge of markets, prior know-
ledge of ways to serve markets, and prior knowledge of customer problems’. As such,
prior knowledge accumulated through experience provides agents with idiosyncratic
resources which, in turn, can be a potent source of competitive advantage when applied
to discover and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities (Nayyar 1990). Miller (2003)
introduced a three-step model that exemplifies how firms (not limited to service pro-
viders) convert asymmetries into resources enabling them to benefit from competitive
advantage. The author demonstrated that building capabilities out of asymmetries
involves that the firm is capable of doing ‘three things well:
1. Discover the asymmetries (…) and discern the potential between them.
2. Turn asymmetries into capabilities by strategically embedding them within an
organizational design configuration that exploits them and sustains their development.
3. Match asymmetry-derived capabilities to market opportunities’ (Miller 2003), p. 965.
Therein, the identification and selection of valuable asymmetries require both intern-
ally and externally oriented processes, including experimentation, incremental learning,
organizational introspection, reflective inquiry and search for weaknesses, and boot-
strapping on emerging capabilities (Miller 2003, p. 965–968). Within this framework,
firms build their competitive advantage not on resources and capabilities as the
resource-based view (RBV) suggests but on asymmetries in skills, processes and a
variety of tangible and intangible assets (including cultural values) which their competi-
tors cannot copy and/or absorb at a cost that afford economic rents.
Results and discussion
The development of information economics has had a profound impact on economic
theory. By attempting to ‘capture informational aspects of market structure’, industrial
economists enlarged our knowledge of ‘the ways in which markets adapt, and the
consequences of informational gaps for market performance’ (Spence 2002, p. 435).
Because information is imperfect and costly to gather and interpret, ‘demand could dif-
fer from supply in equilibrium’ (Stiglitz 2000, p. 1460). This information revolution irri-
gated many different fields, including applied microeconomics, financial economics,
labour market theory and the theory of the firm. It also triggered the development of
original modelling techniques, including asymmetric information game theory and
standard agency theory (SAT). Within this framework, designing and writing contracts
between parties that hold different information sets and cognitive abilities became a
central question, in particular when parties negotiate for the exchange of new goods
and services. The allocation of property rights, the organisational design of R&D activ-
ities, the financing of the various phases of the innovation process and the sharing of
productive knowledge all raised research questions that called for theoretical and
empirical investigations. However, some scholars consider that the explanations pro-
vided by industrial and financial economists regarding how agents overcome infor-
mation asymmetries do not draw on the full implications of the existence of
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Fundamentally, these scholars consider that asymmetries represent an essential source
of disequilibrium within and across markets, the latter generating entrepreneurial op-
portunities (Shane 2000) that individuals, depending on their own knowledge and abil-
ities, recognise, evaluate and develop further. The foregoing involves going beyond the
study of rational strategies (e.g. signalling, screening, monitoring) enabling individuals
to negotiate contracts which mitigate the negative effects of asymmetric information, to
focus research efforts on the role played by intangible, socio-cognitive assets individuals
exploit when evaluating and developing opportunities. In addition, the study of infor-
mation asymmetry as a source of opportunities requires elaborating on theories and
methodological tools that differ from contractual approaches (Eckhardt and Shane
2003). As an illustration, contrasting financial economics perspectives, some organisa-
tional theorists proposed that potential investors rely on social capital assets to select
which ventures to fund when information is asymmetrically distributed among agents.
Shane and Cable (2002, p. 366) contended that ‘social obligations between connected
parties, and information transfer through social relationships, influence venture finance
decisions’. Therein, consistent with a self-interested approach to the investors' behav-
iour, social ties enable investors to obtain private information about the ventures to
fund and their potential opportunities. In addition, direct and indirect ties ‘create social
obligations between the parties, which cause them to behave generously towards each
other’ (Shane and Cable 2002, p. 370). By referring to these two complementary mecha-
nisms, the authors underlined the role played by the entrepreneurs' social capital (e.g.
reputation) in providing investors with additional information about his or her capacity
of implementing, managing and developing the venture. In the same vein, scholars
reported many examples of successful innovative companies that find ways to harness
the benefits of information asymmetries by participating in collaborative networks.
Within networks, the firm must confront the challenge of selecting the ‘right’ research
partner based on its private information about the quality of the scientific knowledge
available on the market and its cost. Here again, information asymmetries make it diffi-
cult for private companies to discriminate between the variety of offers, and the selec-
tion of partners is guided by socio-organisational factors. In particular, ‘geographic and
social proximity (…) should play a determining role in the choice of research partner’
(Abramo et al. 2011, p. 85). Social capital, direct and indirect ties and reputation effects
are likely to guide the firm in identifying promising research partners if information
about their quality is lacking. Tödling et al. (2009) supported this assertion indicating
that collaborative innovation that draws on new scientific knowledge requires personal
interactions among innovation stakeholders. The development of collaborative innovation
enables stakeholders to interact, communicate and share knowledge through formal
(e.g. licensing, spin-offs) as well as informal (e.g. socio-cultural proximity, personal
linkages) relationships.
The above discussion exemplifies how contractual and entrepreneurial approaches of
innovation could combine to improve our understanding of how innovations are man-
aged under information and knowledge asymmetries. We suggest that the reconcili-
ation of these two views of the role played by information asymmetries requires
decomposing the management of innovation into two distinct but coordinated phases.
The first phase refers to the invention phase of the innovation process. It is concerned
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activities correspond to three sequences of the innovation process involving specific or-
ganisational and technological challenges which cannot be reduced to contractual ar-
rangement issues. Since the theory of entrepreneurship as a discovery process aims at
detecting, formulating and elaborating on opportunities, it offers conceptual and meth-
odological frameworks that fit with the challenges of exploring each sequence separ-
ately and understanding the way they connect to each other. The second phase,
referring to the commercialisation phase, is concerned with the market-oriented and
appropriation sequences. The latter suppose that innovations, whatever their types
(e.g. drastic versus non drastic, goods versus service, technology versus organisation),
already exist. Therein, industrial and financial economics provide useful theoretical
and empirical tools to investigate how stakeholders involved in innovation projects
manage to capture and distribute the value generated by bringing new ideas to the
marketplace. The foregoing suggests a natural division of labour between the two ap-
proaches of innovation: while the theory of entrepreneurship as a discovery procedure
develops useful insights into the upstream sequences of the innovation process (e.g. in-
vention), industrial economics provides consistent modelling techniques for dealing
with downstream sequences of contracting for and financing innovation (e.g. commer-
cialisation). Rather than introducing conflicting perspectives on innovation, we con-
tend they provide complementary views on critical phases of the innovation process.
Conclusions
This article focused on the role played by asymmetric information in the management
of innovation. Building on a literature review, it observed that information asymmetry
plays a dual role as it constitutes both a major source of market failures and a condi-
tion for entrepreneurial opportunities to exist. The idea that a single phenomenon can
be considered as a failure and an opportunity is fascinating. While industrial and finan-
cial economists indicate that asymmetric information is likely to trigger opportunistic
behaviours, Austrian economists and entrepreneurship theorists maintain that it pro-
vides agents with incentives to develop new ventures. Are asymmetries sources of add-
itional transaction costs and opportunistic behaviours? Or do they identify with critical
conditions for entrepreneurial and profitable opportunities? We finally argued that the
reconciliation of the contractual and entrepreneurial views of the information asym-
metries could deepen our understanding of the various phases that make up innova-
tions. Hence, we assumed that the sequences through which ideas are generated,
evaluated and developed (invention phase) respond to different logics and involve dif-
ferent capabilities than market-oriented sequences of commercialisation of ideas and
appropriation of the value generated (commercialisation phase).
We hope that the assumption put forward in this article would encourage further re-
search into the management of innovation as a decomposable process made up with dis-
tinctive sequences, each referring to specific phases of generation, evaluation, development,
commercialisation and appropriation of information and knowledge-based opportunities.
Endnotes
a.It should be noted that our bibliometric search strategy led to focus on mainstream
researches in the economics of information and innovation. Consequently, a large part
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http://www.innovation-entrepreneurship.com/content/3/1/5of the applied literature on such issues as technological change and innovation policy
has been left aside, including articles that have been published in such renowned
journals as The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization or Research Policy.
We acknowledge that these journals do often publish articles that examine the role
played by information asymmetry in a variety of economic contexts. However, we also
obcsserve that when these articles specifically investigate how information asymmetries
affect innovation management, the adopted theoretical framework, references and
methodology are very often identical to those published by mainstream economics
journals. In addition, enlarging our bibliometric search strategy to include such key-
words as ‘technological change’, ‘knowledge’ or ‘innovation policy’ would have make the
number of references artificially exploded, thus making the literature review intractable.
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no competing interests.
Received: 11 September 2013 Accepted: 4 October 2013
Published:
References
14 Jan 2014Aboody, D, & Lev, B. (2000). Information asymmetry, R&D, and insider gains. The Journal of Finance, LV(6), 2748–2766.
Abramo, G, D’Angelo, CA, Di Costa, F, & Solazzi, M. (2011). The role of information asymmetry in the market for
university-industry research collaboration. J Technol Transfer, 36, 84–100.
Aghion, P, & Tirole, J. (1994). The management of innovation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 1185–1209.
Akerlof, G. (1970). The market for ‘Lemmons’: Quality uncertainty and the market machanism. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 84(3), 488–500.
Amit, R, Glosten, L, & Muller, E. (1990). Entrepreneurial ability, venture investments, and risk sharing. Manag Sci, 36(10),
1232–1245.
Ang, J, & Cheng, Y. (2011). The endogeneity of information asymmetry and corporate financing decisions. The Journal
of Financial Research, XXXIV(3), 441–440.
Anton, J, & Yao, DA. (1994). Expropriation and inventions: appropriable rents in the absence of property rights. Am Econ
Rev, 84(1), 190–209.
Anton, J, & Yao, DA. (1995). Start-ups, spin-offs, and internal projects. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 11(2),
362–378.
Anton, J, & Yao, DA. (2002). The sale of ideas: strategic disclosure, property rights, and contracting. Rev Econ Stud, 69(3),
513–531.
Anton, J, & Yao, DA. (2004). Little patents and big secrets: managing intellectual property. RAND J Econ, 35(1), 1–22.
Ardichvili, A, Cardozo, R, & Ray, S. (2003). A theory of entrepreneurial opportunity identification and development. J Bus
Ventur, 18, 105–123.
Audretsch, DB, Bönte, W, & Mahagaonkar, P. (2012). Financial signalling by innovative nascent ventures: the relevance
of patents and prototypes. Res Policy, 41, 1407–1421.
Barath, TS, & Pasquariello, P. (2009). Does asymmetric information drive financial structure decisions? The Review of
Financial Studies, 22(8), 3211–3243.
Bester, H. (1985). Screening vs. rationing in credit markets with imperfect information. Am Econ Rev, 75(4), 850–855.
Bhattacharya, S, & Ritter, JR. (1983). Innovation and communication: signalling with partial disclosure. Rev Econ Stud, 50
(2), 331–346.
Bhattacharya, S, Chatterjee, K, & Samuelson, L. (1986). Sequential Research and the Adoption of Innovations (38th ed., pp.
219–243). Oxford: Oxford Economic Papers.
Bhattacharya, S, Glazer, J, & Sappington, DEM. (1990). Sharing productive knowledge in internally financed R&D
contests. J Ind Econ, 39(2), 187–208.
Cohen, B, & Winn, MI. (2007). Market imperfections, opportunity and sustainable entrepreneurship. J Bus Ventur, 22, 29–
49.
Crémer, J, & Khalil, F. (1992). Gathering information before signing a contract. Am Econ Rev, 82(3), 566–578.
Davis, L. (2001). R&D investments, information and strategy. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 13(3), 325–342.
Eckhardt, JT, & Shane, SA. (2003). Opportunities and entrepreneurship. J Manag, 29(3), 333–349.
Gallini, NT, & Winter, RA. (1985). Licensing in the theory of innovation. RAND J Econ, 16(2), 237–252.
Gallini, NT, & Wright, BD. (1990). Technology transfer under asymmetric information. RAND J Econ, 21(1), 147–160.
Grossman, SJ, & Hart, OD. (1983a). An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica, 51(1), 7–45.
Grossman, SJ, & Hart, OD. (1983b). Implicit contracts under asymmetric information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
90, 123–156.
Guesnerie, R, Picard, P, & Rey, P. (1989). Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk neutral agents. European Economic
Review, 33(4), 807–823.
Hart, OD, & Moore, J. (1988). Incomplete contracts and renegotiation. Econometrica, 56(4), 755–785.
Harzing, A. (2012). Journal Quality List. Available at http://www.harzing.com/jql.html.
Healy, PM, & Pelepu, KG. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: a review of the
empirical literature disclosure literature. J Account Econ, 31, 405–440.
Barbaroux Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship Page 15 of 152014, 3:5
http://www.innovation-entrepreneurship.com/content/3/1/5Jansen, J. (2010). Strategic information disclosure and competition for an imperfectly protected innovation. The Journal
of Industrial Economics, LVIII, 2, 349–372.
Kirzner, I. (1997). Entrepreneurial discovery and the competitive market process: an Austrian approach. J Econ Perspect,
35(1), 60–85.
Kyles, A. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica, 6, 1315–1335.
Lapan, HE, & Moschini, G. (2000). Incomplete adoption of a superior innovation. Economica, 67(268), 525–542.
Lewis, G. (2011). Asymmetric information, adverse selection and online disclosure: the case of eBay motors. Am Econ
Rev, 101, 1535–1546.
Lewis, TR, & Sappington, DEM. (1997). Information management in incentive problems. J Polit Econ, 105(4), 796–821.
Martimort, D, Poudou, J-C, & Sand-Zantman, W. (2010). Contracting for an innovation under bilateral asymmetric
information. J Ind Econ, LVIII(2), 324–348.
Milgrom, P, & Roberts, J. (1986). Relying on the information of interested parties. RAND J Econ, 17(1), 18–32.
Milgrom, P, & Roberts, J. (1987). Informational asymmetries, strategic behavior, and industrial organization. Am Econ Rev,
77(2), 184–193.
Miller, D. (2003). An asymmetry-based view of advantage: towards an attainable sustainability. Strateg Manag J, 24(10),
961–976.
Nayyar, PR. (1990). Information asymmetries: a source of competitive advantage for diversified service firms. Strateg
Manag J, 11(7), 513–519.
Picard, P. (1987). On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection. Journal of Public
Economics, 33(3), 305–331.
Quirmbach, HC. (1986). The diffusion of new technology and the market for an innovation. RAND J Econ, 17(1), 33–47.
Riordan, MH, & Sappington, DEM. (1987). Information, incentives, and organizational mode. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 102(2), 243–264.
Sappington, DEM. (1982). Optimal regulation of research and development under imperfect information. The Bell
Journal of Economics, 13(2), 354–369.
Sappington, DEM. (1991). Incentives in principal-agent relationships. J Econ Perspect, 5(2), 45–66.
Shane, S. (2000). Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. Organ Sci, 11(4), 448–469.
Shane, S, & Cable, D. (2002). Network ties, reputation, and the financing of new ventures. Manag Sci, 48(3), 364–381.
Shane, S, & Venkataraman, S. (2000). The promise of entrepreneurship as a field of research. Acad Manag Rev, 25(1),
217–226.
Spence, M. (1976). Informational aspects of market structure: an introduction. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4),
591–97.
Spence, M. (2002). Signaling in retrospect and the informational structure of markets. Am Econ Rev, 92(3), 434–459.
Stiglitz, J. (2000). The contributions of the economics of information to twentieth century economics. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115(4), 1441–1478.
Stiglitz, JE, & Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. The American Economic Review, 71
(3), 393–410.
Takalo, T, & Tanayama, T. (2010). Adverse selection and financing of innovation: is there a need for R&D subsidies? J
Technol Transfer, 35, 16–41.
Tirole, J. (2009). Cognition and incomplete contracts. Am Econ Rev, 99(1), 265–294.
Tödling, F, Lehner, P, & Kaufmann, A. (2009). Do different types of innovation rely on specific kinds of knowledge
interactions? Technovation, 29(1), 59–71.
Trester, JJ. (1998). Venture capital contracting under asymmetric information. J Bank Financ, 22, 675–699.Cite this article as: Barbaroux: From market failures to market opportunities: managing innovation under
asymmetric information. Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship
10.1186/2192-5372-3-5
2014, 3:5Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
